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Abstract: This paper is part of a larger ethnographic project on citizenship
and sexuality. More specifically, I demonstrate how the law ambivalently
constructs sadomasochism as a sexual practice. I explore this ambivalent
relationship through the disjunctions of legal discourse and how particular
bodies are socially constructed through two court rUlings in the Terri-Jean
Bedford case. Terri-Jean Bedford is a dominatrix who was charged and
convicted for keeping a common bawdy house in Thornhill Oust outside of
Toronto) in October 1998. My analysis concentrates on how these rulings
CUlturally construct knowledge about "other" sexual bodies so that eroticism is
rigidly and uncritically understood in (hetero)sexual terms. I demonstrate how
the rulings consistently return to a particular version of what "sexuality"
means. Knowledge is never produced so simply, hence, Terri-Jean Bedford's
complicity and participation in producing meaning(s) is included. In addition to
the court rulings, there are short excerpts from Bedford's unpublished
manuscript which explore the complexity of how knowledge is produced.
Although there is a hegemonic Truth that resonates in legal discourse, I also
include subjugated voices that contribute to their own subjugation. Thus,
contested knowledges resonate in the place of a final "ruling" or politics.
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Who gets to speak in a court of law and under what circumstances does the
speaking subject acquire the status of a reliable speaker? What are the culturally
constructed conditions which deem some discourses acceptable, thus reliable, and
others oppositional, and therefore marginal? The following critique centers on
how particular knowledges about sexuality and sexual practice are rendered
"transparent" under the guise of the Law. Sadomasochism (s/m) as a sexual
practice is a particularly ambiguous sexual category. In other terms, constructed
notions of "appropriate" sexual relations remain within a domain of heterosexual
knowledge. Consequently role-playing, fantasy, fetishes, and the delicate line
between pleasure/pain fall outside of a dominant and normative discourse. To
this end, the conceptualization of erotic knowledge is contingent upon how
various actors negotiate their sensuality in sites such as the courtroom. My aim is
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not to designate a site of sexual resistance-this would ignore the complicated
terrain of power. Instead, sadomasochism in this instance is partial knowledge.
In other words, the actors' understanding of sadomasochism including the
author's shifts accordingly, thus, demonstrating that sexual knowledge is not final
and absolute.
On 9 October 1998, Judge Roy Bogusky delivered two significant rulings in the
Terri-Jean Bedford case. Bedford, a dominatrix was charged for keeping a
common bawdy house, in September of 1994. The first ruling outlines. the final
decision on whether Bedford's bungalow was a common bawdy house or slm
dungeon. The second ruling, serves to outline the inappropriate actions of the
fifteen police officers who dismantled Bedford's home, strip searched her, and
used excessive force during the arrest. I
Terri-Jean Bedford was found guilty based on Judge Bogusky's finding that slm
constitutes prostitution and not fantasy fulfillment. There has been no legal
decision, as yet, as to whether or not accepting payment for slm constitutes a
criminal act. A common bawdy house according to the Dictionary 0/ Canadian
Law (1995) is "a place that is a) kept or occupied, or b) resorted to by one or
more persons for the purpose of prostitution or the practice of the acts of
indecency.,,2 Bedford strongly contests that her Thornhill bungalow (in Toronto)
was a bawdy house and asserts her status as a dominatrix, insisting that the site
of her business was her residenceldungeon (house ofsadomasochism).3
Deconstructing these rulings untangles the power of unquestioned categories and
therefore renders what Patricia Williams (1991) describes as being characteristic
of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Williams (1991 :8) points to the exclusive
categories and "definitional polarities" that are supposed to make life easier.
These would include categories such as good/evil, public/private, moral/immoral.
Alternative analysis, or other ways of "seeing" are perceived "outside" and
therefore" 'emotional', 'literary', 'personal', or just Not True" (Williams
1991:9). .
Tracing Sexual Normalcy
The representation of slm as radical subversion may border on reactionary when
it is deemed politically superior. Bedford's assertive sexual politics and identity
as a dominatrix clearly counters a moral hegemony that promotes heterosexual
normalcy and the erasure of other sexual cultures. The mainstream media, for
example, lingered on the sensational aspect of sadomasochism and its "bizarre"
fantastical elements (or its diversion from normative notions of sexual
gratification). Ironically, Terri-Jean Bedford's (1998) moral rejection of
prostitution on the other hand (articulated most elaborately in her unpublished
manuscript), disregards the political agency that might exist in various sex trades
like prostitution. The politicized links based on a sexual citizenship and the
critique of legal and moral assertions of criminalized sexualities fails to include
complicated agencies that may exist within the sex trade. Bedford's failure to
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make these links, unfortunately, assumes a hierarchical critique of "sexual
politics" where one practice (sadomasochism) takes moral and political precedent
over another (prostitution).
What prevails in both of Judge Bogusky's rulings, apart from the singular voice
of the Judge, is a logic of heterosexuality, whereby prostitution is the major site
of contention. Sexuality based on the efforts of women to entice clients through
their female bodies, negates any prospect that these bodies may engage in
domination, thereby making the notion of seduction an ambiguous category. What
creeps into Judge Bogusky's description is a familiar heterosexism that falls
within the boundaries of what may be considered prostitution:
In the erotic area of the house, ifyou were to add in female employees
dressed in lingerie, which was the case, a strong sexual and erotic
mood would be created (R v. Bedford, October 9, 1998, unreported 1,
emphasis added)
The idea that adding comprises some secret formula of sexuality, as if the recipe
for erotics could not traverse the stereotypical interaction between male and
female already sets up sadomasochism narrowly within the confinement of the
Judge's knowledge. Bedford on the other hand, clearly states that "there is no end
to the list of things which serve as fetish wear" (Bedford:2, "Costumes and
Doms"). She includes the diversity of fantasy, which is directly linked to what
the dominatrix wears. Lingerie, within the limited description of the Judge, is the
symbolic erotic order that negates any performative likelihood such as cross
dressing.
To further evade performative possibilities of slm in Judge Bogusky's
description, he narrows down the complexity of slm by describing staged
situations as follows:
The moods ranged from the satanic where articles of torture and
death were present and in order to stimulate the bondage seekers. to
the burlesque where a small stage is erectedfor the cross dressers
(R v. Bedford, unreported).
The range of possibilities again are limiting, and there is the added Judeo-
Christian association of evil, or the satanic. Articles of torture and death are
categorized through the Judge's assertion that they are satanic. In opposition to
this inherent "evil" is the erotica area (women in lingerie) which stands in
contrast to death and torture. The logic here is not as objective or innocent as it
first appears, and that which is rendered as evil, or satanic is contrasted against
the Good and Norma\.4 "Treatment of good/evil as a duality is wired into the
intrinsic order of things" (Connolly 1993 :366) and what is good is embodied in
the Law and the Normal. Having defined the good, the evil falls unquestionably
within proper ideological parameters. In this case, what is sexually "evil" or
satanic falls outside of normal imagery of sex. Ironically, the imagery of women
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in lingerie is set up as transparently sexual, while this sexual "normality" is also
part of an illegal framework-that is prostitution. The apparent "contradictions"
do not necessarily conflict because they always operate effectively within specific
discourses. For example, if slm was not the issue and the matter was clearly
about prostitution, the tendency would be to treat the prostitute body as that
which is outside of the norm and the norm would, perhaps, enforce the idea of
monogamous heterosexual relationships where sexual interest does not include
the exchange of money for sex and is mainly for reproductive purposes. 5 In this
case, prostitution is set up in opposition to slm and apparently, while still illegal,
is acceptable in terms of its "proper" (hetero)sexual exchange.
Who Speaks?: The Politics of Truth Telling
Although Judge Bogusky's first ruling requires the knowledge of witnesses to
explain and describe s/m6, his authorial position determines and designates
whose descriptions are in fact "reliable" and "truthful." Moments of reflexivit/
or a recognition that slm requires alternative forms of understanding escapes
judicial reasoning. Instead, the Judge's designations affirm that the specificities
of sexual knowledge are irrelevant in the space of the court room (Code 1995:59).
Following Lorraine Code's reading of how Foucault deconstructs the testimonial
in nineteenth-century Europe, I also find it useful to think through these
interactions as testimonial accounts, particularly as they relate to the "rhetorical
spaces" (Code 1995) of the court room. What is important here is the way in
which "knowers" do not reveal fully their beliefs because completion of what is
understood through the testimony is not fulfilled. Hence, "its failure to reach
completion causes the speakerltestifier to doubt the veracity, the validity even of
herlhis 'own' experiences" (Code 1995:59). The structure of the courtroom and
legal process determines to a certain degree the 'experience' of the speaker. In
the space of the courtroom, the narratives of subjugated knowledges are
suppressed and replaced with the "facts." This is further accentuated with the
unquestioned power of a final ruling, a moment whereby "truths" are re-made
and re-fashioned accordingly.
Judge Bogusky's preferred witness, who went by the name of "Princess," was a
short time employee of Bedford who was being trained as a dominatrix, and
whom police officers questioned at length during the search (without the presence
of a lawyer). What is unsettling is the decision to privilege Princess's testimony
when, in fact, "she had little knowledge of s/m" (R v. Bedford), The Judge,
however, prefers her testimony because "she appeared, at trial, to be a person of
quality and gave her evidence in a straight forward and credible manner" (R v.
Bedford:2, emphasis added). The "truths" that she might have expressed are
selected and so her testimony as to the excessive force of the police is disregarded
for the reason that, "...(it) was less reliable, but that is understandable as things
happened very quickly that day" (R v. Bedford:2). Here we find" 'the master of
truth'[- the Judge] literally allows - or refuses to allow - the truth to establish
itself' (Code 1995:59).
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Although Princess appears to be Judge Bogusky's preferred witness, it is relevant
to point to the circumstances that warrant his preference. Princess's use of her
body as a livelihood predetermines the validity of her character in the space of the
court room.s In other terms, her confusion is naturalized as unreliable
knowledge, and knowledge being rational and not "confused" negates her
testimony. The 'master of truth,' on the other hand, fathoms what is confusion
and what is order. More importantly, he determines what is valid knowledge.9
Power effectively creates moments that are not produced in negative terms of
exclusion or abstraction, instead, what is produced in this case are testimonies of
truth, whereby "the individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him/[her)
belong to this production" (Foucault 1977:194). Princess's inconsiderable
knowledge of slm, and the potential support of portraying slm as a practice that
includes sexual acts yields to the expectations of the court. Yet, her testimony as
to the actions of the police are not considered, making her an unreliable witness
in the next instance. This is the recurrent tone of the ruling which undeniably
returns to a certain narration of sexuality, one that is not outside normative
productions of sexual indecency.
The Production of Sensual Knowledge(s)
Stimulation, in Bogusky's ruling, pre-supposes its meaning, leaving very little
room for interpretation. The assumption made in the making of the ruling is that
stimulation can only occur within the sexual erotics of a typified scene of sexual
exchange where the male responds to the female in a precise manner. Similarly,
the consensus of this exchange extends itself to the acceptable knowledge of what
count as "erogenous zones." "She (Princess) gave descriptions of some form of
stimulation being applied to every area of the male body, all of which have been
accepted as erogenous zones" (R v. BedfordJ, emphasis added). The possibility
of "female erogenous zones" seems absent from the erotic logic of Judge
Bogusky, ignoring that Bedford also had female clients. 1O The focus on male
genitalia, ["It is apparent the genitals received much attention and the penis was
usually tied in some fashion" (R v. BedfordJ)] can be a result of two contested
discourses. On the one hand, it is the phallocentrism of what constitutes
eroticism, and on the other hand Bedford's presentation (interpretation) of slm
practice is complicit in the production of phallocentrism. She recognizes that
creating fantasies was always more accessible for men, since, in general men
have higher incomes (Bedford: 1 "Women Clients"). The issue of class is
pertinent here although the courts do not discuss this aspect except to
acknowledge that sessions were expensive. Bedford, too, though challenging
normative sexual expectations, is complicit in maintaining class boundaries that
in some cases do exclude women. She unknowingly perpetuates normative
definitions of erogenous zones by placing emphasis on the phallic which results
in nourishing boundaries between sexual subjects.
The final section in the first ruling concludes in a way that upholds previous
(hetero)sexual imagery and fails to consider even the slightest possibility of
"other" forms of sexual expression. Moreover, the notion that slm should even
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be considered is made irrelevant, since the final judicious reasoning points to the
discourse of prostitution. Judge Bogusky concludes the first ruling with the
following:
A case against the accused has been made without the Court having to
get into the broader question ofwhether every form ofSand M for hire
is sex for hire. The facts of this case were not difficult to interpret.
Common sense allows no other interpretation for a scenario involving
a naked male with a rope around his penis being attended to by a
female, even more so when she is wearing lingerie (R v. Bedford 3,
emphasis added).
The "common sense" that Judge Bogusky depicts implies that being in
disagreement is illogical, thus, having the effect of censoring any other
interpretation. For example, the idea that a naked man and a woman in lingerie
equal a (hetero)sexual encounter annuls other readings of slm, which, according
to Terri-Jean Bedford, vary and are dependent on the particular fantasy being
played out. The role playing that may occur when a man is naked and bound may
refer to the performance of domination and submission. According to Valerie
Steele (1996:171), "clothing itself is generally associated with power, and
nakedness with its lack...the dominatrix is usually clothed [lingerie?]. By
contrast the slave, bottom, masochist, or submissive is often stripped naked or
reduced to wearing clothing that exposes breasts, buttocks, and/or genitals." In
reality, then, it is possible that Judge Bogusky has (mis)interpreted what seems
obvious because of the cultural associations already in place in regard to the
thinkable interaction that can occur between a naked man and a somewhat
clothed woman.
The Rise and Fall of the Empire/Phallic:
Moral Regulation Enacted
The second ruling specifically deals with the manner in which the search warrant
was conducted. This ruling is not distinct from the previous one and the
perception of "abnormal" sex acts continues to dominate much of the logic. The
ruling creates scenarios which justifY a search warrant and, moreover, it creates
moral panic in order to explain the presence of an Emergency Police Task Force.
Considering the "offense," it is difficult to imagine how it is justified. However,
at the same time, any explication of excessive police action is made irrelevant
since, according to Judge Bogusky, the only witness (Princess) which he found
reliable was "confused" about what actually went on during the search. Terri-
Jean Bedford, whom Judge Bogusky does not even mention, is not included as a
reliable witness even though she claimed to have a direct encounter with the
police that day. Bedford describes the scene in her manuscript, and the reader is
given a sense ofhow the police responded:
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...fifteen men lined up behind him (main officel) at the door. The
officer with the badge pushed me aside and the men rushed into the
house... they were plain clothes detectives, uniformed constables and an
Emergency Task force team, acting like they believed they were
capturing terrorists or hijackers ... a massive officer grabbed me and
told me to sit on one of the couches in the living room. J hesitated a
second and he grabbed me around the chest and punched me several
times on the side of the head. Then he held me down on the couch.
(Bedford, The Raid: I)
63
The search is left to the discretion of the police who, as law enforcers, do not
need to explain procedures to suppress indecent sexuality. I I
The ruling strategically downplays the excessive force of the police by admitting
to the "overkill," "bit of bad taste" and "rowdyism." Yet, the ruling positions
these acts as natural consequences to the events that took place. What emerges,
once again, are the sexual overtones that give rise to "normal behavior"
advocated by Judge Bogusky:
The rowdyism which developed in the basement. And if everybody
recalls, the basement had the erotica area and you know it is--ifyou-
want to get a reaction from a bunch of voung bucks, present them with
some imagery ofthe male anatomy, including images ofpenises plus the
equipment for cross-dressing and you might get a rather strange
reaction. The reaction which flowed was almost predictable. You know
there was a lot of rowdyism downstairs and hooting and howling and
ultimately the officer in charge had to tell them to put a lid on it. 1 do
not know with what word you would describe it. Rude. J do not know.
Something along those lines (R v. Bedford, October 9, 1998 unreported
2, emphasis added).
What is strangely suggestive from this passage is that erotic spaces cause (male)
rowdiness in a way that is expected and supported in settings that are considered
"unnatural," or under circumstances which may present ambiguous masculinity
(i.e. cross-dressing). The notion of "predictability" returns to a discourse of
science where a logical process will consequently determine certain behaviour.
Yet there is an admission that the police did not behave accordingly since their
actions were not absolutely predictable but "almost." Thus, the "strange"
surroundings that they might have encountered are understood as contradictory to
a "normal" state, returning once more to a logic of binary oppositions that clearly
mark moral/immoral spaces.
The "erotic area" had equipment for cross-dressing and some imagery of penises
which might have appeared to the police to be placed in rather uncertain terrain.
Masculinity in a heteronormative sense was no longer a "natural" part of sexual
presentation. Cross-dressing leaves the "penis" betwixt and between what is
considered its sexual place in society and so this contradiction, according to Judge
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Bogusky, entails ;;strange reactions." He affirms acceptable notions of
masculinity by describing and, therefore, justifYing the police's actions as those
of "young bucks." Thus, he emphasizes a wild and natural masculinity; a slang
for "male" identity. If this is the case, and if this imagery is taken seriously, then
the assumption is that being male allows for such reactions in order to secure
masculine sexuality. Judge Bogusky may not be "defending" the actions of the
police, per se, but he constructs a scenario that is in accordance with a bourgeois
sexual morality; one which at all costs defines the boundaries of proper sexual
behaviour. The kernel of importance, abiding by the charge of keeping a common
bawdy house, remains in the realm of an incontestable kind of sexual exchange.
To put it another way, a specific sexual discourse is legitimized, leaving s/m
unexplored as an "other" sexual practice. Sexual normalcy reigns in the
formulation of the law and most eminently (hetero)sexuality surfaces at every
turn. In the case of the second ruling, the actions of the police are encoded in a
logic of sexual normalcy.12
Displacing 81M: Articulating Regulation
The practice of s/m remains hidden and is manifested in a grotesque form, but in
a form that emphasizes "normal" sexual practice nonetheless. In her description
of the police's "rowdiness," Bedford elaborates on how s/m is manipulated in the
hands of the police giving (hetero)sexuality power and especially legitimacy:
... Upstairs Morgan and J sat on the couch, upset and yelling to the
officers that they had no right or reason to be there. 1 saw the officer
who hit me and said, "1 want your badge number. J'm charging you
with assault." He laughed and said, "Call me master" (Bedford: 2
"The Raid", emphasis added).
This exchange, although using the "language" of s/m, has significantly different
meaning and consequences. The utterance implies the immediate "real" control
of the police over Bedford's sexuality. Her role of dominatrix is reversed in this
case without any predetermined consent. She is strip searched and the police
continue to manifest "reactions" towards "strange surroundings."
... Morgan (employee) was appalled when she saw what was going on
downstairs. She saw them (police) playing with the whips while wearing
the wigs... Princess said that she'd seen officers playing with my
equipment and jokingly threatening each other with whips ... Morgan
told me after that what most struck her during this time was the look on
the faces of the officers. "You could tell by the way they looked at me
that they wanted to be spanked, and they were turned on by the
restraints and equipment" (Bedford:2 "The Raid").
The point of Morgan's narrative is not to "prove" in some way that the police
were in fact "turned on," since this entails a certain amount of interpretation.
However, what seems important is that their reaction is not that of refusal but,
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instead, their particular "role playing" mockingly expresses a grotesque sense of
their sexuality. SIM, though unfamiliar, is given sexual significance in the
exchange between Morgan and the police, who later kiss her feet mockingly
(Bedford:2). This exchange once again complies with the hegemony of (hetero)
sexual relations, where the woman is no longer the dominatrix but the sexual
object. In uttering "Call me master," the police shift the local knowledge
(discourse) of slm into a realm of "legitimate" discourse making it admissible.
Although Judge Bogusky may not have mentioned these "reversed roles" in the
ruling, the certainty of how the police conducted the search is encoded in a
language which justifies their actions and in doing so, pronounces the triumph of
a particular kind of (hetero)sexual ity.
If the actions of the police were "almost" predictable, thereby admitting to the
inappropriateness of their conduct, this is partially due to "rules" which they
failed to follow. These rules were overturned in order to collect evidence, giving
the discourse of science its rightful place during the search. The plethora of
articles that were taken from Bedford's home were not, for the most part, related
to the charge. However, Judge Bogusky rules that "the police must follow the
rules of collecting evidence" (R v. Bedford 4). Under the legal guise of collecting
evidence, no explanation is necessary, and I would add that the already persistent
descriptions of "strangeness" in Bedford's household permits that any object is
reified as potentially sexual. 13 Removing items from the Bedford home also
symbolically removes sexual ambiguity and by dismantling those "strange"
spaces, normative (hetero)sexuality is (almost) affirmed.
Judge Bogusky does not grant any recognition that there was an abuse of force
except to say that, "Any relief I can give the accused will appear on sentence" (R
v. Bedford: I I). The implications of this decision merge the power of the state, in
its coercive ideological form, with the power of a process of logical (scientific)
procedure. The sentence is not what matters but the final judgment that "other"
sexual practices in fact could never be understood outside of heterosexual
relations. I have demonstrated that the final words of Judge Bogusky in the space
of the courtroom resonate with "common sense" (hetero)sexual "definitional
polarities" (good/evil, moral/immoral) that operate behind a veil of objectivity. It
is hard to imagine if at any point there is an attempt to co-construct the various
dimensions of sadomasochism which would potentially abandon a master
narrati ve of sensory "conduct." 14
Conclusion
The over determination of (hetero)sexuality loses ground not only by those who
object to its hegemonic discourse, but also by the already unstable sexuality
which expresses itself as the "original." Behind normative constructions that
appear in spaces such as the courtroom, what surfaces is the uncertainty of
(hetero)sexuality as the "original," of which other sexualities are copies. IS Thus,
acting out ofline with heterosexual norms brings with it social ostracism but also
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transgressive pleasures produced by those very prohibitions (Butler 1991 :24).
What the police encounter during Bedford's arrest does not only initiate "strange"
reactions, as the Judge suggests, but a reaction embedded in the absolute refusal
of their own heterosexuality and pleasure in the erotic "other" (or that which
defies normalcy). "In other words, heterosexuality is always in the process of
imitating and approximating its own phantasmatic idealization of itself - and
jailing" (Butler 1991:21). To maintain this phantasmatic idealization, those
deemed "other" are perpetually defined in opposition to a normative (hetero)
sexuality and "other" knowledges are presumed unreliable (Princess's
testimony). 16
The circumstances of speaking and being deemed a "reliable" speaker shifts, if
just temporally, when the knowledge produced in the courtroom, the knowledge
uttered in the form of a ruling, is critically scrutinized. The "final" judgment
depends in part on the stability of its utterance as final and, therefore, not open to
other interpretations, or the refusal to recognize other interpretations as legitimate
productions of knowledge.
Stated assumptions, which propose conclusions that comply with the Normal and
the Good, appear in the Judge's final assessment of the meaning of slm, which
already presupposes a particular (hetero)sexuality that is applied to affirm the
normative criminality of prostitution. Both rulings, though slightly different in
their content, return to what seems to cause the most anxiety; the assurance that
"normative" sexual practice, even in its illegality, contains indisputable sexual
exchange. The supposed transparency of this claim is validated in the space of
the courtroom where legal procedure naturalizes the objective stance of Judge
Bogusky's polar descriptions of Bedford's home and the meaning of
sadomasochism, the house search and arrest, and the "naturally" masculine and
legitimate reactions of the police.
Finally, I propose that knowledge in its many tangled and multifaceted forms is
never innocent and without complication. All players in this struggle of sexual
definition confront both what they oppose and support. However, it is in the
already accumulated social knowledge of sexuality that these discourses operate.
Hence, the possible epistemological disruptions occur not only in disrupting
truths, but also in acknowledging the co-constructedness and contradiction of
knowledge production.
* * * * *
Endnotes
IExcerpts from Bedford's unpublished manuscript, Bondage Bungalow
Dominatrix (1998) are used to minimize the monological ruling by incorporating
her voice as counter narrative. It is unfair to give too much credit to this approach
since, as the author, I choose the excerpts and, therefore, I do not claim to be
giving Terri-Jean Bedford a voice. There is always room for (mis)interpretation.
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2 Following this definition there is already an assumption of what those
"indecent" acts might look like..
67
3 Sadomasochism has challenged anti-pornography debates that have categorized
it in terms of a sexual practice that reflects patriarchal society and therefore
degrades women. For elaboration on the debates, see Mariana Valverde (1989).
For a better understanding of sadomasochism as constituting a complex set of
relations that are situated historically and socially, see McClintock's (1995) work
on cross-dressing and the cult of domesticity and also McClintock (1993). Here
there is an attempt to decriminalize sex work such as prostitution. The women
are not victims of a capitalist economic system and their bodies perform a critical
sexuality. To read about how these debates have moved into the realm of
censorship issues, anti-pornography feminists leaning towards the enforcement of
censorship, see Shannon Bell and Brenda Cosman (1997). Anti-censorship
critiques have most often not pointed to the anti-sex dimension of the anti-
pornography movement, which has been predominantly led by Catherine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin (see Valverde 1987).
4 Ironically, prostitution and sexuality begin to merge in an interesting way for the
purpose of setting it up against sadomasochism/fantasy fulfillment.
5 For an extensive discussion on judges' views on prostitute bodies, see Carole
Smart (1995), who interviews several Magistrates and discovers three main
approaches and attitudes towards prostitute women. The "liberal/permissive
discourse" advocates the right, although not agreeing with it, to sell sex. In other
words, the liberal tendency to accept it as long as it is not in view (hence, the
acceptance of a bawdy house). This has other legal implications as to the
possible actions taken against prostitutes who do stand in specific corners. The
"puritan/authoritarian discourse" takes a strong stance against prostitution and
prostitutes, and does so through the campaign to control prostitute bodies through
imprisonment and police control. This discourse has moral overtones. Finally,
the "welfarist discourse" views women as psychologically suffering from
childhood "traumas" and, therefore, "it" is not "their" fault. All three discourses
locate prostitutes in a distinct social category keeping them ｡ ｾ ｪ ･ ｣ ｴ and outside of
the "normal" discourse.
6 Interestingly, Shannon Bell, a political philosopher and dominatrix at York
University, was an expert witness in the case whose testimony was disregarded
because of her supportive position of "other" erotic practices. Moreover, Bell
insisted in her testimony that slm is not about sexual gratification and, as
someone familiar with the environment, she had never seen people having sex in
the sadomasochistic scene. When the issue of the erections during Bedford's slm
scenes was discussed, and which some witnesses testified to, Bell had this to say:
"] have seen erections (in slm scenes) but its important to realize that Socrates
died with an erection, so I don't think it has much to do with sex" (Toronto Star
July 28, 1998). While she could have added to the knowledge of what slm is, and
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re-configured normalizing discourses on sex, this was not possible in the Rational
space of the Law. After all, the idea of "erections" is a sensitive issue if there are
suggestions of an ambivalent sexual masculine response (Code 1995:61).
7 I make a distinction here, as do others (see Babcock 1980), between the
reflexive and reflective. Reflexive takes into consideration the epistemological
underlying of a process. Unlike a mere reflection, which is one's consciousness
of oneself, reflexivity is about being conscious of being self conscious.
8 Linda A1coff (1995:8) argues that the feminist critique of reason stems in part
from the recognition that reason and, therefore, knowledge encompass a universal
practice dominated by men who attribute the rational to that of gendered
inheritance. Where women stand in opposition to (universal) man, " ...women's
traditional concerns have been characterized as the site of irreducibly irrational
particular and corporeal." Although Princess appears to be Judge Bogusky's
preferred witness it is relevant to point to the circumstances in which Princess is
preferred. Pure objectivity would dictate that gender is irrelevant, however, it is
essential to account for relations of power that contrary to ｯｾｩ･｣ｴｩｶｩｴｹＬ the Judge
wi II judge Princess as a woman who makes a living through the use of her body or
excessive "irrationality."
9 At first, the power to validate knowledge seems that it is solely in the hands of
the Judge, and this over determines his role. Following Foucault (1980), I agree
that even those subjugated knowledges contribute to their subjugation (i.e.
Bedford's disassociation to the political potential of prostitution). Power,
therefore, is not invested exclusively in the formulation of the Law but in
multiple negotiated power struggles that comply with scattered moments of
marginalization. Also, it is not the "Judge" per se that carries the burden of a
particular kind of knowledge production. Rather "it is communities, not
individuals, that maintain the resources for the acquiring and certifYing
knowledge. Some People more than others, are assumed to know, or know
how" (Walker 1998:57). Under the Rubric of the Law, especially in the context
of "the ruling," the Judge acquires this privileged status.
10 It is not surprising that any suggestion of gay or lesbian sex is omitted from
Judge Bogusky's definitions. There has been a general common sense, moral
imposition as to supposedly sexually obscene material, which more often than not
depicts gay or lesbian sex. "Even lesbian sex magazines Quim and Bad Attitude,
on route to the Toronto Women's Bookstore, have been seized by Canada
Customs on the basis of the depiction of anal sex" (Bell and Cosman 1997:35).
II There are other examples that illustrate the extent to which the police work to
create moral panic, especially in regard to sex. Bell and Cosman (1997) describe
the impetus behind the child pornography scare in London, Ontario between
1993-1995 where the spectacle of arrests resulted in various police mistakes,
where, in fact, child pornography was not the issue (anyone under 18 according to
the law is considered a "child") but teen hustling. "The discourse of 'child-
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pornography' is being deployed to police the boundaries of legitimate and
illegitimate sexual activity, a boundary that places gay teen sexuality firmly
outside the realm of 'good sex'" (Bell and Cosman 1997:41).
12 "What is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to
a shadow existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad
infinitum while exploiting it as the secret" (Foucault 1980:35, original emphasis).
13 Bedford recounts that, "The police not only took my bondage equipment and
fixtures, they took everyday furniture and clothing. They took my television set,
my bed, and many items so commonplace that it was inconceivable that these
things could be evidence of any sort. I still can't believe the things they seized.
They seized lady's hats. They seized things from the schoolroom like a
blackboard and a small desk. They also took large items such as the living room
set, lounge chairs and numerous other personal items which had no bearing on
the business" ("The Raid":4).
14 Legal discourse as to the sexually obscene, like any discourse, does not operate
exclusively and so sexual politics also struggles against and alongside dominant
understandings of s/m. Interrogating the law is best observed in discursive
moments like those found in Terri-Jean Bedford's unpublished manuscript. Here,
the interrogation of epistemological assumptions about the law permit other
representations from women who are not professionally trained in legal writing to
enter the conversations upon the experience of authority (Gbrich 1991).
ISThe distinction made between "original" and "copy" has been used in
"rationalizing" gay or lesbian identity. I would add that in the case of the above,
the moral imposition of certain symbolic orders negates any other erotic logic.
The insistence for example of what Judge Bogusky determines is so obviously
(hetero)"sexual'-women in lingerie and naked men captures the desperate
insistence to make (hetero)sexuality the norm or "original". Judith Butler (1991)
argues for the performativity of gender of which "drag" manifests itself not to
mimic a "real" but as an elaborative parodic gender, "gender is a kind of
imitation for which there is no original" (Butler 1991 :21).
16 Although Morgan, another of Bedford's employees, encountered the police in a
way that would implicate their participation in s/m (hetero)sexual practice, Judge
Bogusky does not come close to suggesting that the police might have
participated more than they should have. It is their rowdyness, and being "young
bucks" that he emphasizes as though to a certain extent their being "young" rids
them of any" mature" sexual recognition.
* * * * *
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